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1. This article deals with a theme that has yet to receive all the
attention it deserves, namely the uses of the references to the «con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States» (as the wording
of art. 6(3) TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, Preamble and art. 52 put it), or to «common consti-
tutional traditions» (as they are often shortened: CCTs) in the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Justice (CJEU: the acronym refers
hereinafter only to the Court of Justice, and encompasses also the
former European Court of Justice, ECJ).
Although the topic has been studied by some of the most brilliant
legal minds in Europe, one would look in vain for a major work that
stands out as a standard reference. We will not review the literature in
(*) This work is the result of a joint effort. Michele Graziadei is mostly
responsible for drafting paragraphs 1 and 2, while paragraphs 3 and 4 were mostly
written by Riccardo de Caria. We wish to thank the participants in the seminar held at
the Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, 27 April 2017, for sharing their reflections on the
theme of this paper (Vittoria Barsotti, Marta Cartabia, Sabino Cassese, Mario Comba,
Jeffrey Jowell, and Paolo Passaglia). Thanks to Prof. Giuliano Amato, Fernanda
Nicola, and Sabrina Praduroux for their comments on a previous version of the text.
Responsibility for any errors or omissions lies with the authors only. The authors took
notice of legal developments up to the end of August 2017.
this short piece, as our main focus of enquiry is the jurisprudence of the
CJEU on this topic. Helpful as the literature on the subject is, we still
hope to show that much more still can and needs to be done to have
a better understanding of this area of the law, which is open to new
scholarly investigations, even more so in light of the most recent
socio-political trends. Our belief in this possibility is anchored to the
significant remarks by Marta Cartabia: «Unlike other aspects of Eu-
ropean integration, the “Europe of Rights” has always been presented
and perceived as a result of an existent common constitutional tradi-
tion, as opposed to a political bargain» (1).
The following analysis and comments move from the study of the
case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) (2), beginning with
the famous Judgment of 17th December 1970, Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft, 11-70, EU:C:1970:114, where the expression under consid-
eration was first used to justify the assertion that Community law
would enjoy primacy even over fundamental principles enshrined in
national constitutions. As the CJEU put it in that judgment, this was
warranted because: «[...] respect for fundamental rights forms an
integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of
Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Commu-
nity» (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, § 4).
In other words, Community law and institutions would be bound
to protect fundamental rights, as enshrined in the various constitu-
tional traditions and insofar as a common denominator could be
derived from them, therefore national authorities (notably German
ones) should not worry about Community law trumping national
fundamental rights: this would just not happen, and the CJEU with that
judgment intended to be very clear about that.
Almost 50 years down the road, we have the occasion to look back
at nearly five decades of case law on the issue, considering that it
(1) M. CARTABIA, A Pluralistic Europe of Rights, in, The European Court of
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, edited by H.W. Micklitz and B. De
Witte, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, 259.
(2) The sample we have examined (described below, paragraph 3) includes only
judgements and orders by the Court of Justice of the European Union. We have not
investigated cases from the General Court. We have adopted the standard ECLI
citation method every time a ruling was quoted or mentioned for the first time: the
following references appear in shortened form.
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remains highly relevant to the development of EU law (3). We aim to
explore two points in particular, which are our main research ques-
tions. Primarily, whether the Court tends to make reference to CCTs
simply as a rather supple «source of inspiration» (and not as an
autonomous source of fundamental rights) (4) in the protection of
fundamental rights, or rather whether it draws on those traditions
going into an extended search into the single national traditions (and
if so, which are the ones that influence the development of the EU
more regularly). A second, related point concerns the fundamental
rights in connection to which the CCT clause has been referenced more
frequently.
The historical origins of the reference to constitutional traditions
common to Member States in the jurisprudence of the CJEU have been
investigated in depth most recently by Bill Davies (5). At the very
beginning of the story, before the crystallisation of the doctrine into
the present formula, the expression «constitutional ideas» of Member
States was also aired.
The genealogy of the doctrine is located at the intersection be-
tween national constitutional laws and EC law. The search for the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States by the CJEU
was a way to both assert the autonomy of Community order, and to
confirm its dialogic position vis à vis the laws of the Member States,
including their constitutional laws. It was a response to the challenge
first raised by the German Federal administrative court in Internation-
ale Handelsgesellschaft to question the legitimacy of the EU legal order
on the basis of the German constitutional order, that is of its funda-
mental rights and the principles of the national constitutional struc-
ture.
The CJEU met the challenge by pulling the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States out of the proverbial hat. This was a
crucial, strategic turn made to forestall objections raised against EC law
(3) K. LENAERTS, La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not
blind) trust, 54 Common Market Law Review (2017), 805.
(4) As Professor Sabino Cassese put it in the above-mentioned seminar. See
now: S. CASSESE, The «constitutional traditions common to the Member States» of the
European Union, in this issue of Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. (no. 4, 2017).
(5) B. DAVIES, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the miscalculation at the
inception of the ECJ’s human rights jurisprudence, in EU Law Stories, Contextual and
Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence, edited by B. Davies and F. Nicola,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 157 ff.
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in the name of the defence of the constitutional norms of the Member
States. The move was ultimately successful (6). It produced both en-
hanced legitimacy of EC Law and better acceptance of the jurispru-
dence of the CJEU by the Member States. Ultimately, it paved the way
to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a text which has now the
same binding force of the Treaties (although the EU so far has not
acceded to the ECHR, and perhaps it never will), and that pays due
homage to the notion in question, both in the Preamble, and in art.
52.4. «In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those tradi-
tions».
The movement leading to the Charter was accompanied by a
subtle change in the provisions of the Treaties concerning this
matter (7).
The Preamble of the Treaty of Maastricht, which established the
Union in 1992, contains a sentence confirming the attachment of the
Member States to: «the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law».
Article F of the same Treaty recites that the Union: «[...] shall respect
the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of govern-
ment are founded on the principles of democracy». The second para-
graph of art. F is the forerunner of the text of art. 6(3) TUE, and thus
contains a reference to the constitutional traditions that are common
to the Member States. The Treaty of Amsterdam modifies this article
(6) B. DAVIES, op. cit., 155, holds that Internationales Handelsgeselschaft was the
fruit of «a strategic miscalculation on the part of the European Court of Justice», which
led to a strong national reaction (the German Constitutional Court

s Solange decision).
This miscalculation by the CJEU was the fruit of «a fundamental disconnect between the
court, its ambitions and the reception by the Member States» (ibid.). Although we
share this evaluation of the decision, it is still true that it triggered a dynamic that
eventually produced the results hilighted in the text. Although, as we stress above, the
tension underlying this line of cases is not exhausted, the tones have changed. See
Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court reference for a preliminary ruling
concerning the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central
Bank (ECB) of the 18th of August 2017: BVerfG, Beschluss des Zweiten Senats vom 18.
Juli 2017 – 2 BvR 859/15 – Rn. (1-137), commented by M. GOLDMANN, Summer of Love:
Karlsruhe Refers the QE Case to Luxembourg, Verfassungsblog, last checked on the
29th of August 2017.
(7) G. AMATO, Libertà, democrazia, stato di diritto (typescript on file with the
authors, 2017).
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by providing that the Union pays respect to the national identity of the
Member States, without further qualifications. The text of art. F in its
new version has also a new paragraph one, highlight and absorb the
democratic principle: «The Union is founded on the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States». Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, through the transition repre-
sented by the failed Treaty on the Constitution of Europe, incorpo-
rates in its art. 6 the reference to the European charter of human rights
and to the European Convention for the protection of Human rights
and fundamental freedoms, but also introduces a new art. 2: «The
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail».
The reference here is no more to «principles», as in the previous
versions of the Treaty, but rather to «values». There is no clear
explanation for this new language, which now must be read together
with the continuing reference to the «principles» mentioned in art. 6 of
the same Treaty. Nonetheless, the reference to democracy and the rule
of law as «values» reflects the awareness that, at this point, the Union
clearly has ends which are no more merely economic.
The tension between the European level and the national level in
any case is not completely exhausted. The CJEU has moved beyond the
statement contained in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, § 3, accord-
ing to which: «[...] the validity of a Community measure or its effect
within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs
counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the Constitution
of that state or the principles of a national constitutional structure».
It is by now clear that the Treaty imposes to the Court the need to
be sensitive to the «constitutional identity» (8) of the Member States in
(8) On this topic, e.g. A. SAIZ ARNAIZ and C. ALCOBERRO LLIVINA (eds.), National
Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Cambridge, Antwerp, Intersentia,
2013. For an interesting perspective, different from the one adopted in this work, see A.
JR GOLIA, Counter-Limits beyond Europe. The Calvo Doctrine in Latin America and its
Value from a Comparative Law Perspective, forthcoming in Annuario di diritto com-
parato, 2018.
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terms of fundamental values. As the Judgment of 14 October 2004,
Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614, shows, this means that certain fun-
damental values enshrined in national constitutions may be invoked,
for example, to set limits to fundamental freedom protected under the
Treaties, even though they may play out differently in the various
Member States:
«37 It is not indispensable in that respect for the restrictive measure
issued by the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a conception
shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which the funda-
mental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected. [...]
39 In this case, it should be noted, first, that, according to the referring
court, the prohibition on the commercial exploitation of games involving the
simulation of acts of violence against persons, in particular the representation
of acts of homicide, corresponds to the level of protection of human dignity
which the national constitution seeks to guarantee in the territory of the
Federal Republic of Germany. It should also be noted that, by prohibiting
only the variant of the laser game the object of which is to fire on human
targets and thus ‘play at killing

people, the contested order did not go beyond
what is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued by the competent
national authorities.
40 In those circumstances, the order of 14 September 1994 cannot be
regarded as a measure unjustifiably undermining the freedom to provide
services».
This introduces a certain degree of pluralism in the jurisprudence
of the Court, and in its dialogue with the national Courts. This
pluralism is now guaranteed by the notion of ‘constitutional identity
 
of the Member States, which was first introduced in the Treaty on
European Union, in then-Article F para. 2, to acknowledge that the
Union was based on the Member States (9). Art. 4(2) of the Lisbon
(9) The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered Article F as Article 6, while the
Treaty of Lisbon rephrased Article 6, moving the CCT provision in paragraph 3; as
recalled above, CCTs are also mentioned in the Nice Charter, in the Preamble and in
Article 52. The first stages of this evolution were recalled by the CJEU in several
judgments: among others, in Judgment of 15 December 1995, Bosman, C-415/93,
EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 79; Judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly, C-274/99 P,
EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 38; Judgment of 22 October 2002, Roquette Frères, C-94/00,
EU:C:2002:603, paragraph 24; and Judgment of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C-112/00,
EU:C:2003:333, paragraph 72; see also Judgment of 24 April 2012, Kamberaj, C-571/10,
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Treaty articulates this idea adding new dimensions to it: «The Union
shall respect [the Member States
 
] national identities, inherent in their
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of re-
gional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State
functions [...]».
A number of theoretical and empirical questions remain open at
this point. They concern the relationships and the interactions between
the various elements mentioned above on several dimensions.
2. From the theoretical point of view, a first issue to raise
concerns the relationship between «the constitutional principles com-
mon to the Member States», which are recognised as general principles
of EU law, and the other sources mentioned in Art. 6 TUE. This
relationship is not clarified by the article in question, and remains very
much open, being linked to the role of the general principles of law in
the EU order. Takis Tridimas notes in this respect that: «One might
have thought that, given the binding effect of the Charter and the
proliferation of EU legislation, there would be less need to rely on
unwritten general principles of law. This is however not the case» (10).
He contends that the CJEU reliance on arguments based on the
general principles of law is to be read in the light of their functions:
«They synergize the fundamental constitutional underpinnings of the
EU which are grounded on liberal democracy, serving as the facilita-
tors of outcomes that cannot readily be determined by concrete rules,
triggering constitutional dialogue, and even serving as the exponents of
judicial empathy. Furthermore, they serve as an assertion of judicial
independence» (11).
The constitutional traditions common to the member States ap-
pear to share these functions. Their role is multifarious, ranging from
being a tool to interpret existing EU law, to, possibly, a self-standing
ground of review.
A second question is linked to the notion of «constitutional
identity». This poses a new challenge to the approach followed by the
CJEU, by advancing the idea that to ground EU law on the basis of the
EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 60; and Judgment of 6 October 2016, Paoletti, C-218/15,
EU:C:2016:748, paragraph 25.
(10) T. TRIDIMAS, The general principles of law: who needs them?, in Cahiers de
droit européen (2015), 421.
(11) T. TRIDIMAS, op. loc. cit.
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constitutional traditions common to the Member States may not be
enough to secure the legitimacy of the EU from the point of view of the
Member States in crucial instances.
An objection of this kind was raised in the BVerfG reference for
a preliminary ruling in the Gauweiler case, concerning the legitima-
cy of the European Central Bank OMT program (Judgment of 16
June 2015, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, C-62/14,
EU:C:2015:400). As the order for reference states, while the Court of
Justice is the competent authority to interpret EU law, the German FCC
retains the right to determine «the inviolable core content of the
constitutional identity and to review whether the act interferes with
this core». The German constitutional court thus claimed to have the
final say on the legality of the OMT programme within the German
legal order. The CJEU did not take any position on the FCC
 
s reserve
power, but simply stated that preliminary rulings are binding on the
national courts (Gauweiler, § 16), thus avoiding a possible ground of
conflict.
This was a wise choice, yet the reference to the notion of consti-
tutional identity as a way to assert the primacy of the national order of
values over the European one, or over the way these values are upheld
at the European level, is still potentially disruptive. As a form of
intangible patrimony, which is «integration proof» (12), it is the classi-
cal last ditch defence against the harmonising efforts that are some-
times carried out through the elaboration of the notion of constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States. Yet, the generality of
the idea leaves the door open to a much more fine-grained approach to
the fundamental questions raised by the notion of constitutional
(12) This is the language of BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 15 December
2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14 – para. 1-126 (henceforth: Identity review order decision), at 49:
«Die [...] für integrationsfest erklärten Schutzgüter dulden auch keine Relativierung im
Einzelfall [...]». The quote is from the second decision of the FCC dealing with the
European arrest warrant. The Court stresses the absolute character of the protection of
constitutional identity granted to the right to dignity, that under the German Consti-
tution is held to be an absolute right, not to be relativized by any case-by-case-balancing
against countervailing interests. In this case, the right to dignity demanded the respect
of «minimum guarantees of the rights of the accused in criminal trials» (cf. §§ 52, 56, 59,
76, 83 f., 107). The decision is commented from different angles by E. URÍA GAVILÁN,
Solange III? The German Federal Constitutional Court Strikes Again. European Papers,
in European Forum, Highlight of 16 April 2016, 367-368; M. HONG, Human Dignity and
Constitutional Identity: The Solange-III-Decision of the German Constitutional Court,
VerfassungsBlog, 2016/2/18 (last checked on the 29th of August 2017).
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identity (13), and to explore which coordination mechanism may be
found to reach more satisfactory results for all the players in the
field (14).
The reference to the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States is — in other words — in a dialectical relationship with
the notion of constitutional identity (15). But the notion of «constitu-
tional identity» is not self-evident either. If the CJEU reference to the
constitutional traditions of the Member States is often somewhat
apodictic, the same can be said of the reference at the a national level
to the constitutional identity of the State. Is it not true that such
identity is by and large shared with the other Member States? Is it not
true that comparative law has a substantial role to play in clarifying this
(13) See Joined Cases C-404 & 609/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert C

ld

raru
v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber)
of 5 April 2016, EU:C:2016:198. G. ANAGNOSTARAS, Mutual confidence is not blind trust!
Fundamental rights protection and the execution of the European arrest warrant:
Aranyosi and Caldararu

, in 53 Common Market Law Review (2016), 1675 ff., rightly
considers this judgment as an implicit answer by the CJEU to the approach advanced by
the FCC in the Identity review order decision mentioned in the previous footnote. The
judgment makes clear that the CJEU is very sensitive to the concerns that the FCC voices
about the application of EU law and its effects on the national constitutional require-
ments (much more than it proved to be only a few years earlier in its Judgment of 26th
February 2013, Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, where it simply (re)stated, at § 59,
that «[i]t is settled case-law that, by virtue of the principle of primacy of EU law, which
is an essential feature of the EU legal order [...], rules of national law, even of a
constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on
the territory of that State (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case 11/70 Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3, and Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten
[2010] ECR I-8015, paragraph 61)»).
(14) A. SAIZ ARNAIZ and C. ALCOBERRO LLIVINA (eds.), National Constitutional
Identity and European Integration, supra note 8.
(15) SeeV. CONSTANTINESCO, La Conciliation Entre la Primauté du Droit de
l’Union Européenne et l’Identité Nationale des Etats Membres: Mission Impossible ou
Espoir Raisonné?, in Common European Legal Thinking. Essays in Honour of Albrecht
Weber, edited by H.-J. Blanke, P. Cruz Villalón, T. Klein, J. Ziller, Springer, Berlin,
2015, 104: «Si la primauté, telle qu

initialement conçue par la Cour de justice, revêt un
caractère absolu (tout le droit de l

Union l

emporte sur tout le droit interne contraire),
le fait que la réalisation concrète de la primauté dépende aujourd

hui d

une multiplicité
d

instances vient incontestablement la relativiser. Témoin de cette évolution, la notion
d

identité nationale que l

on peut considérer comme un infléchissement à la primauté du
droit de l

Union»; see also the truly enriching reflections by O. POLLICINO, Della
sopravvivenza delle tradizioni costituzionali comuni alla Carta di Nizza: ovvero del
mancato avverarsi di una (cronaca di una) morte annunciata, in Dir. Ue, 2016, 253.
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aspect? (16) These are questions that must find answers, possibly not
apodictic ones. It may well be that the view articulated by the BVerfG
in its own Gauweiler ruling (17) is misconceived, at least from the point
of view of the adherence of the German State to the ECHR and to other
international instruments, for example. All too often identities, like
traditions, are conceived in a monolithic way, while they are not, as a
comparative approach to their study shows (18).
From an empirical point of view, there are several important
questions relating to the main theme: How does the Court arrive at the
conclusion that a certain norm is part of the common constitutional
traditions of the Member States? What weight has the comparison of
the laws of the Member States in this respect? How to identify new,
emerging constitutional traditions? Is it useful to try to provide a
practical guide to the traditions which are already accepted as «com-
mon to the member States»? What about traditions which have been
considered, but that are not common to the Member States? And how,
at Member State level, is the reference to this common patrimony by
the CJEU received?
3. To probe into these questions, we elaborated a sample of CJEU
documents through a first search performed in the Eur-Lex database,
updated on 10 July 2017 using the search string «constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States». This singled out precisely 100
rulings by the CJEU containing the pertinent expression, i.e. 92 judg-
ments and 8 orders. There is a linguistic issue to consider in the
selection of this sample. In the English versions of the European
documents reviewed, there are four occurrences of the expression
«common constitutional traditions» instead of the one used by the
Treaty. No such variations appear in the Italian text of the pertinent
documents. Hence the sample was selected by working on the Italian
version of the documents in the first place. Many more references to
the same concept can be found in other documents, in particular in the
opinions by the Advocate Generals (167). Reviewing all of them would
(16) K. LENAERTS, The European Court of Justice and the Comparative Law
Method, in Eur. Rev. Private law (2017), 297.
(17) BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13,
2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13.
(18) See S. CASSESE, Fine della solitudine delle corti costituzionali, ovvero il
dilemma del porcospino, in Ars Interpretandi, 2015, 21 ff.; M. GRAZIADEI, Comparative
Law, Legal History and the Holistic Approach to Legal Cultures, in 3 ZeUP 531 (1999).
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have gone beyond the purposes of this work. Surely this shows that this
is a fruitful area of investigation. In particular, it would be very
interesting to try to assess to what extent the opinions making more
references to CCTseventually influenced the Court of Justice.
Out of the 100 rulings examined to prepare this paper, there are 92
judgments and 8 orders that mention the expression in question. As for
the 92 judgments, 68 are rendered on references for a preliminary
ruling, while the rest concern different proceedings.
A first criterion adopted to categorise the rulings, on top of the
two research questions identified under paragraph 1, is the chronologi-
cal one. As mentioned, above the notion was first introduced by the
CJEU in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. After that decision, it ap-
peared in 1974 in Nold, 4-73, EU:C:1974:51, and then five years later,
in 1979, in Hauer, 44/79, EU:C:1979:290. After Hauer, it was briefly
mentioned in the Judgment of 26th June 1980, National Panasonic,
136/79, EU:C:1980:169. So in the first decade (1970-1980), there are
only four judgments referring to the notion we are discussing (including
the forerunner of 1970).
After this first period, we find two references in 1986 and 1987 (the
important cases Johnston and Heylens, respectively), and then a peak
of five in 1989 (totalling 6 in the 1980
 
s).
The Single European Act, in force since 1 July 1987, evokes the
idea in its Preamble, which shows a commitment of the signatories «[...]
to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamen-
tal rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member
States in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter notably
freedom equality and social justice».
Contrary to a reasonable expectation one might have, the Maas-
tricht Treaty (signed on 7th February 1992, and in force since 1st
November 1993), that, as recalled above, introduced a reference to the
CCTsin the TEU, was not a turning point. We find one case (Judgment
of 18th June 1991, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi [ERT], C-260/89,
EU:C:1991:254) in 1991, two in 1992, none in 1993, and then only one
or two cases per year until 1998 (no case again is recorded in 1999).
The new wording of the Treaty on European Union, now explicitly
referencing the notion of CCTs, was first referenced in the famous
Bosman judgment delivered in 1995.
Numbers rose instead in the 2000
 
s. In that decade we located 48
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out of the 92 total judgments, with a peak of 22 rulings between 2006
and 2008; together with 7 out of 8 orders, which totals 55 out of 100.
In the current decade, the pace has slowed: after 4 cases in 2010
and 5 in both 2011 and 2012, there have been 2 cases every year so far
in the period from 2013 to 2017 (this it adds up to 25, on top of the only
one order of 2010).
Moving on to the two points indicated in the first paragraph above,
first of all, as far as originating countries are concerned, twenty rulings
originated from Germany, sixteen from Italy, eleven from Belgium,
nine from the UK, seven from Austria, six from Austria and France
each, five from the Netherlands, three each from Spain and Ireland,
two each from Bulgaria, Greece, and Sweden, and finally one each
from the Czech Republic, Portugal, Malta, Luxembourg, Latvia, and
Hungary. These numbers should be interpreted in the light of the
well-known fact that the Courts of some Member States resort more
often to the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU
(and its predecessors) than others.
More importantly, it appears that, out of the 100 documents
reviewed, only one case, Hauer, contains an analysis of the wording of
the constitutions of three Member States (Germany, Italy, and Ireland)
to verify whether a certain principle is in fact a CCT. The only case that
gets close to Hauer (although without mentioning specific constitutions)
is a Judgment of 11th January 2000, Netherlands and Gerard van der
Wal v Commission, C-174-189/98 P, EU:C:2000:1, which is a rare, if not
unique, «negative» case: indeed, in § 17 the Court states that a certain
principle cannot «be deduced from the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States».
In virtually all the other cases, the CJEU just states that a particular
principle is stemming from the CCTs without more, almost as it were a
matter of fact (19): Hauer dates back to the very first line of cases, so if
one exceptions exists, it is by now rather remote, and is definitely not
connected to a hypothetical more recent shift towards more in-depth
(19) As was mentioned above, this work does not deal with the opinions of
advocate generals, however it seems appropriate here to mention two equally rare
Opinions that (even though very briefly and only in footnotes) explicitly review
Member States

constitutions in order to assess whether a common principle can be
derived from them, i.e. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 14 October 2004,
Berlusconi et a., C-387-391-403/02, EU:C:2004:624, footnote 129; and Opinion of
Advocate General Szpunar of 4 February 2016, Rendón Marín, C-165/14, and CS,
C-304/14, EU:C:2016:75, footnote 118).
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analyses, which is then a disproved hypothesis. In other words, the
«source of inspiration» approach of the first rulings has been main-
tained throughout the almost fifty years since its inception. In this
scenario, the question concerning whose constitutions are considered
for the assessment becomes inevitably moot.
The other important criterion chosen to categorise the pertinent
cases is to which fundamental right the CCT clause is related. Out of
the 100 cases identified, 27 resorted to the CCT clause with regard to
the right to effective judicial protection (20) concern the respect of
judicial defence rights, while four (Judgment of 6 September 2012,
Trade Agency, C-619/10, EU:C:2012:531; Judgment of 25 January
2007, Salzgitter Mannesmann, C-411/04 P, EU:C:2007:54; Judgment of
2 May 2006, Eurofood, C-341/04, EU:C:2006:281; Judgment of 26 June
2007, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, C-305/05,
EU:C:2007:383) concern the right to a fair trial. To summarize, more
than one third of the cases (36 out of 100) mention the CCT clause to
deal with the protection of fundamental rights before courts.
Similarly, five cases (the Judgment of 14th February 2012, Toshiba,
C-17/10, EU:C:2012:72; the Judgment of 28th April 2011, El Dridi,
C-61/11 PPU, EU:C:2011:268; the Judgment of 11th March 2008, Rü-
diger Jager, C-420/06, EU:C:2008:152; the Judgment of 3rd May 2005,
Berlusconi et a., C-387-391-403/02, EU:C:2005:270; the Judgment of 8th
March 2007, Campina, C-45/06, EU:C:2007:154) concern the principle
of retroactive application of the more lenient penalty; and three more
(the Judgment of 3rd June 2008, Intertanko, C-308/06, EU:C:2008:312;
the Judgment of 3rd May 2007, Advocaten voor de Wereld, C-303/05,
EU:C:2007:261; the Judgment of 12th December 1996, Criminal pro-
ceedings against X., C-74-129/95, EU:C:1996:491) are instead related to
(20) Among others, the most relevant are the Judgment of 27th June 2013,
Agrokonsulting, C-93/12, EU:C:2013:432; the Judgment of 13th March 2007, Unibet,
C-432/05, EU:C:2007:163; the Judgment of 3rd September 2008, Kadi, C-402/05,
EU:C:2008:461; the Judgment of 1st April 2004, Commission v. Jego-Quéré, C-263/02,
EU:C:2004:210; Judgment of 15th October 1987, Heylens and Others, 222/86,
EU:C:1987:442; and the Judgment of 15th May 1986, Johnston, 222/84, EU:C:1986:206.
On a closely related matter, five more the Judgment of 2nd April 2009, Gambazzi,
C-394/07, EU:C:2009:219; the Judgment of 7th January 2004, Aalborg Portland, C-204-
205-211-213-217-219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6; thr Judgment of 17th October 1989, Dow
Benelux, C-85/87, EU:C:1989:379; the Judgment of 17th October 1989, Dow Chemical
Ibérica, 97-98-99/87, EU:C:1989:380; the Judgment of 21st September 1989, Hoechst,
46/87-227/88, EU:C:1989:337.
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the principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties (nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege). The second largest group of cases is thus
the one that mentions the CCT clause in connection with the protection
of fundamental rights in the field of criminal procedure.
The other cases to mention concern other fundamental rights: four
cases (the Judgment of 10th July 2003, Aquacultur, C-20-64/00,
EU:C:2003:397; the Judgment of 11th July 1989, Schräder, 265/87,
EU:C:1989:303; Hauer; and Nold) concern the right to property; three
(Connolly; Schmidberger; and the Judgment of 25th March 2004,
Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen, C-71/02, EU:C:2004:181) involve
freedom of expression; two (the Judgment of 14th March 2017, Ach-
bita, C-157/15, EU:C:2017:203; and the Judgment of 14th March 2017,
Bougnaoui, C-188/15, EU:C:2017:204) involve freedom of conscience
and religion; and the last two cover the principle of non-discrimination
(the Judgment of 19th April 2016, Dansk Industri, C-441/14,
EU:C:2016:278, on grounds of age; and the Judgment of 10th May 2011,
Römer, C-147/08, EU:C:2011:286, on grounds of sexual orientation).
The remaining 45 cases cannot be purposefully categorized, be-
cause their only mention of the CCT clause is perfunctory: typically, it
is included in the reconstruction of the legal context of the case
together with citations to other sources, with no impact at all on the
reasoning leading to the outcome of the ruling (21). To be sure,
however, the vast majority of the 55 cases that we categorized also
mention CCTs only once, in sentences that seem to be rather ornamen-
tal.
4. As mentioned above, then, most of the times CCTs are used at
best as a «source of inspiration». In almost half of the cases, the
reference to CCTs is not even inspirational, it is only a passing refer-
ence, almost a perfunctory invocation, with no particular significance.
This relates to a more general problem, that is, the case-law of the
Court does not disclose in very clear terms which are the arguments to
consider a specific right as an integral part of the CCTs.
As far as the former group of cases is concerned, usually older
cases are referenced in newer ones. Therefore, if one goes back to the
origins, one could expect to find a deeper analysis with regard to the
(21) For a recent instance of this see: Judgment of 16 July 2015, CHEZ Razpre-
delenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480,
paragraph 3.
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CCTs evoked, but this is not the case: such in-depth analysis is almost
always missing.
The plausible explanation is that what the CJEU typically does is to
rely on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and on its
enforcement by the Court of Strasbourg. Even though some anticipa-
tions can be traced back to previous rulings (22), this approach was
«officially» inaugurated with the Nold judgment:
12. [In the applicant

s complaint, a decision by the Commission in the
field of competition law] is said to violate [...] a right akin to a proprietary
right, as well as its right to the free pursuit of business activity, as protected by
the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic of Germany and by the Constitu-
tions of other Member States and various international treaties, including in
particular the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Protocol to that Convention of
20 March 1952.
13. As the Court has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures.
In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot there-
fore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recog-
nized and protected by the Constitutions of those States.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on
which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories,
can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of
Community law.
After Nold, and after the first case (the Judgment of 28th October
1975, Rutili, 36-75, EU:C:1975:137, paragraph 32 (23)) explicitly refer-
encing the provisions of the ECHR (although not mentioning CCTs),
(22) In particular, usually the case mentioned is Judgment of 12 November 1969,
Stauder, 29/69, EU:C:1969:57, paragraph 7.
(23) «Taken as a whole, these limitations placed on the powers of Member States
in respect of control of aliens are a specific manifestation of the more general principle,
enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and ratified
by all the Member States, and in Article 2 of Protocol No 4 of the same Convention,
signed in Strasbourg on 16 September 1963, which provide, in identical terms, that no
restrictions in the interests of national security or public safety shall be placed on the
rights secured by the above-quoted Articles other than such as are necessary for the
protection of those interests “in a democratic society”».
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came the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council
and the Commission concerning the Protection of Fundamental Rights
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (24). With this declaration the three institutions
stressed «[...] the prime importance they attach to the protection of
fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of
the Member States and the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom», committing «[i]n the
exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of the European
Communities to respect and continue to respect these rights.».
The Joint Declaration was referenced in the next relevant case by
the CJEU, Hauer, as a reaffirmation of its own «conception» in Inter-
nationale Handelsgesellschaft and Nold. As was recalled, this is the
case with the deepest analysis of the actual existence of a common
constitutional tradition in the field of the right to property.
The trend towards deferring to the ECHR system, and in particular
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECTHR), to determine what
constitutional traditions are common to European States, was then set
in stone in Johnston. Paragraph 18 of that judgement is one of the most
frequently cited by the CJEU when referencing to the Court of Stras-
bourg in relation to CCTs:
«18. The Requirement of judicial control [...] reflects a general principle
of law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States. That principle is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
of 4 November 1950. As the European Parliament, Council and Commission
recognized in their Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 [...] and as the Court has
recognized in its decisions, the principles on which that Convention is based
must be taken into consideration in Community law».
This statement was confirmed the following year in Heylens,
holding that the right to a judicial remedy against decisions of national
authorities: «reflects a general principle of Community law which
underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States
and has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms»
(§ 14).
(24) Official Journal C 103, 27/04/1977 P. 0001 - 0002.
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Two years later, the same principle was reformulated again in
three judgments, Hoechst, Dow Benelux and Dow Chemical Ibérica:
«13. The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights are an
integral part of the general principles of law the observance of which the
Court ensures, in accordance with constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, and the international treaties on which the Member States
have collaborated or of which they are signatories (see in particular, the
judgment of 14th May 1974 in Case 4/73 Nold v Commission ((1974)) ECR
491). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as «the
European Convention on Human Rights») is of particular significance in that
regard (see, in particular, the judgment of 15 May 1986 in Case 222/84
Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ((1986)) ECR
1651)» (25).
The progeny of these three cases (and of the previous ones already
mentioned) is a very long list of variations on the theme. The most
frequently referenced are ERT (paragraphs 41 ff.) (26), which was
delivered before the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, and then the
Judgment of 3rd December 1992, Oleificio Borelli, C-97/91,
EU:C:1992:491, paragraph 14; the Judgment of 11th January 2001,
Siples, C-226/99, EU:C:2001:14, paragraph 17; Connolly, paragraphs 37
ff.; the Judgment of 25th July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores,
C-50/00 P, EU:C:2002:462, paragraph 39; Roquette Frères, paragraphs
23 ff.; Schmidberger, paragraphs 69 ff.; Omega, paragraph 33; Berlus-
coni et a., paragraph 67; the Judgment of 22nd November 2005, Man-
gold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 74; Unibet, paragraph 37.
Deference to the ECTHR was also reaffirmed in the important Judg-
ment in Kadi I (paragraphs 283 and 335), and in other two recent ones,
Bougnaoui (paragraph 29), as well as in the famous Achbita
(paragraph 27).
(25) This citation is from the former case; § 24 of Dow Benelux and 10 of Dow
Chemical Ibérica have the same wording.
(26) See in particular this quote from § 42: «[...] where [national] rules do fall
within the scope of Community law, and reference is made to the Court for a
preliminary ruling, it must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the
national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental
rights the observance of which the Court ensures and which derive in particular from
the European Convention on Human Rights».
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Usually, references to the ECTHR are rather generic, but some-
times specific cases are cited as authorities by the CJEU. For instance,
specific references appear in the following cases: Criminal proceedings
against X, paragraph 25; Netherlands and Gerard van der Wal v
Commission, paragraph 17; the Judgment of 28th March 2000, Krom-
bach, C-7/98, EU:C:2000:164, paragraphs 39-40; Connolly, § 39;
Roquette Frères, § 25; the Judgment of 20th May 2003, Rechnungshof,
C-465/00, C-138-139/01, EU:C:2003:294, paragraphs 73-77 and 83; Her-
bert Karner Industrie-Auktionen, paragraph 51; the Judgment of 14th
February 2008, Varec, C-450/06, EU:C:2008:91, paragraph 48 (27).
Interestingly, this dialogue seems to be bidirectional, particularly in
more recent years. First of all, at least one judgment of the European
Court of Human Right shows an inquiry into the actual existence of a
CCT, that is vaguely reminiscent of the one carried out by the CJEU in
Hauer (also concerning the protection of the right to property): no spe-
cific constitution is analysed explicitly, however the Court arrives at the
conclusion that: «even where the texts in force employ expressions like
“for the public use”, no common principle can be identified in the con-
stitutions, legislation and case-law of the Contracting States that would
warrant understanding the notion of public interest as outlawing com-
pulsory transfer between private parties» (28).
Beyond that, several ECTHR cases refer to CJEU rulings, or
advocate generals
 
opinions, when illustrating relevant European and
international law materials. The first most relevant case in this regard
is arguably Bosphorus (29), which makes an effective summary of the
CJEU
 
s case law on fundamental rights, in relation to the ECHR and the
ECtHR:
(27) Some of them are mentioned (together with other cases with no reference to
CCTs) in the ECTHR

s judgment in Bosphorus, cited below (footnote 28), at footnote
8.
(28) Judgment of 21 February 1986, James and Others v. The United Kingdom,
8793/79, CE:ECHR:1986:0221JUD000879379, paragraph 40 (emphasis added); in a
particularly dialogue-oriented spirit, the judgment goes on to refer to a judgment by the
Supreme Court of the United States cited by the parties in argument (Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff 104 S.Ct.2321 [1984]). This case was also cited as precedent several
years later in Judgment of 28 March 2017, Volchkova and Mironov v. Russia, 45668/05
and 2292/06, CE:ECHR:2017:0328JUD004566805, paragraph 109.
(29) Judgment of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret
Anonim irketi v. Ireland, 45036/98, CE:ECHR:2005:0630JUD004503698.
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«73. While the founding treaties of the European Communities did not
contain express provisions for the protection of human rights, the ECJ held as
early as 1969 that fundamental rights were enshrined in the general principles
of Community law protected by the ECJ [Stauder]. By the early 1970s the ECJ
had confirmed that, in protecting such rights, it was inspired by the constitu-
tional traditions of the member States [Internationale Handelsgesellschaft]
and by the guidelines supplied by international human rights treaties on which
the member States had collaborated or to which they were signatories [Nold].
The Convention

s provisions were first explicitly referred to in 1975 [Rutili],
and by 1979 its special significance amongst international treaties on the
protection of human rights had been recognised by the ECJ [Hauer]. There-
after the ECJ began to refer extensively to Convention provisions (sometimes
where the Community legislation under its consideration had referred to the
Convention) (30) and latterly to this Court

s jurisprudence (31), the more
recent ECJ judgments not prefacing such Convention references with an
explanation of their relevance to Community law».
For years after Bosphorus, Scoppola (No. 2) (32) relied extensively
on the CJEU
 
s ruling in Berlusconi et al., where: «the Court of Justice of
the European Communities held that the principle of the retroactive
application of the more lenient penalty formed part of the constitu-
tional traditions common to the member States».
(30) Here the ECTHR cites the following cases: Hauer, paragraph 17; Judgment
of 10 July 1984, Regina v. Kent Kirk, 63/83, EU:C:1984:255, paragraph 22, where a
periphrasis is used instead of the usual CCT formula, which let us to exclude this case
from our selection: «[...] the principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive
effect is one which is common to all the legal orders of the Member States and is
enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms as a fundamental right; it takes its place among the general
principles of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice»; Johnston,
paragraph 18; Hoechst, paragraph 18; Judgment of 18 May 1989, Commission of the
European Communities v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 249/86, EU:C:1989:204,
paragraph 10 (according to which then-EEC acts had to «be interpreted in the light of
the requirement [...] set out in [...] the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. That requirement is one of the fundamental rights which,
according to the Court

s settled case-law, restated in the preamble to the Single
European Act, are recognized by Community law»; ERT, paragraph 45; Bosman,
paragraph 79; and Judgment of 6 November 2003, Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01,
EU:C:2003:596, paragraph 90 (a less important case concerning freedom of expression).
(31) See above, footnote 26.
(32) Judgment of 17 September 2009, Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), 10249/03,
CE:ECHR:2009:0917JUD001024903.
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Finally, in 2016, Avotiš (33) made again extensive references to
the legal framework concerning the protection granted to «fundamen-
tal rights in European Union law», citing Krombach, paragraphs 25-27;
the Judgment of 14th December 2006, ASML, C-283/05, EU:C:2006:787,
paragraphs 26-27; and the Judgment of 22nd December 2010, DEB,
C-279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraph 29, to pronounce on the intersec-
tion between recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in civil
and commercial matters and the protection of fundamental rights.
5. The analysis shows that the CJEU almost never engages in an
in-depth investigation of the actual existence of a CCT. The circum-
stance that the Nice Charter and the ECHR by definition enshrine such
a common norm establishes a very strong presumption in this respect.
As far as the empirical issue raised above, under paragraph 2, is
concerned, namely how the Court usually determines that a certain
principle or rule derives from the CCTs of the Member States, we have
therefore a straightforward answer to the question. On the other hand,
the case-law of the Court prior to the enactment of the Charter shows
that a certain «tradition» can be considered part of that common
patrimony even though it is represented only in a minority of consti-
tutional texts. Thus, for example, in Mangold, the Court declared that
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States upheld the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age although, at the time,
just two Member States, namely Finland and Portugal enacted this
prohibition in their constitutions.
An important aspect to consider when assessing the use of the
concept over time is that, when the CCT clause was first coined, the
Member States were fewer than today. As a consequence, it was
arguably much easier to determine whether certain constitutional
traditions were common to the Member States or not by consulting
their constitutions. At the time of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,
the Member States were still the original six. When Hauer was re-
(33) Judgment of 23 May 2016, Avotiš v. Latvia, 17502/07, CE:ECHR:2016:
0523JUD001750207. Meanwhile, in Judgment of 4 March 2014, Grande Stevens and Oth-
ers v. Italy, 18640/10 18647/10 18663/10 18668/10 18698/10, CE:ECHR:2014:0304
JUD001864010, the Italian Government had argued that the EU recognised the existence
of a CCT explicitly authorising: «[...] the use of a double penalty (administrative and
criminal) in the context of the fight against illegal conduct on the financial markets [...],
particularly in areas such as taxation, environmental policies and public safety» (ibid., §
216).
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leased, on the 13th of December 1979, the three constitutions consid-
ered by the Court (the Italian, German, and Irish ones) represented
one third of the Member States. As recalled above, in 2002 the
Advocate General had to examine the constitutions of twenty-five
Member states to conclude that the principle of the retroactive appli-
cation of a more lenient penal law was common to the constitutional
traditions of the Member States, with the British and Irish constitu-
tional systems differing from the rest (34).
Whatever be the reasons, the undisputed fact remains that an
in-depth analysis of national jurisdictions is lacking in most of the
judgments that explore whether a certain constitutional tradition is
common to the Member States. This choice owes much to the circum-
stance that the CJEU has chosen (or has found itself in the position of
inevitably doing so) to defer to its Strasbourg counterpart in advancing
on this ground. This is clearly a major contribution to the strengthen-
ing of the judicial dialogue between the two highest judicial institutions
in Europe.
Arguably, our initial hypothesis that CCTs are a powerful counter-
part to the notion of ‘constitutional identity
 
is confirmed. If the latter
may be used to protect and reaffirm a certain pluralism, which in some
cases may coloured by a stronger sense of national sovereignty (albeit
in a framework of loyal cooperation, mutual assistance and respect),
references to the CCTs mostly go in the opposite direction, acting as a
centripetal force. Therefore, framing the request of a preliminary
reference by choosing to highlight one or the other theme is a gesture
of some weight (35). A deeper analysis of this dynamic would require
a deeper analysis of the role of national traditions in the making of the
jurisprudence of the Court and of the use it makes of comparative
arguments, a topic that is a rather formidable challenge (36).
(34) Berlusconi et al., C-387/02 (footnote 129); more recently, Advocate General
Szpunar reviewed the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian and Slovak
constitutions in Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, C-304/14 (footnote
118).
(35) See M. BASSINI and O. POLLICINO, The Opinion of Advocate General Bot in
Taricco II: Seven «Deadly» Sins and a Modest Proposal, Verfassungsblog, 2 August
2017, last checked on the 10th of August 2017.
(36) For two enlightening contribution on this: F. NICOLA, National Legal Tradi-
tions at Work in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in 64
Am. J. Comp. Law 4 (2016), 865; K. LENAERTS and K. GUTMAN, The Comparative Law
Method and the European Court of Justice: Echoes Across the Atlantic, ibid., 841.
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From this perspective, it is probably not by accident that the CCTs
usually feature in landmark cases, or in cases where the stakes are
particularly high. Bosman, Omega, Berlusconi et a., Mangold, Unibet,
Intertanko, Kadi, the same Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, and
most recently Achbita are illustrative of this point.
Advocate General Cruz Villalón advances this point in one of his
Opinions. We may therefore conclude by borrowing some of his words
in the landmark case concerning the legality of the OMT programme by
the ECB (Gauweiler):
«61. [...] I think it useful to recall that the Court of Justice has long
worked with the category of ‘constitutional traditions common

to the Mem-
ber States when seeking guidelines on which to construct the system of values
on which the Union is based. Specifically, the Court of Justice has given
preference to those constitutional traditions when establishing a particular
culture of rights, namely that of the Union. The Union has thus acquired the
character, not just of a community governed by the rule of law, but also of a
“community imbued with a constitutional culture”. That common constitu-
tional culture can be seen as part of the common identity of the Union, with
the important consequence, to my mind, that the constitutional identity of
each Member State, which of course is specific to the extent necessary, cannot
be regarded, to state matters cautiously, as light years away from that common
constitutional culture. Rather, a clearly understood, open, attitude to EU law
should in the medium and long term give rise, as a principle, to basic
convergence between the constitutional identity of the Union and that of each
of the Member States» (37).
Very promisingly, the notion of constitutional identity is here
applied to the Union itself. At least potentially, CCTs are therefore still
an excellent candidate to help in bridging the gap between the Union
 
s
constitutional identity and the evolving constitutional identities of the
Member States, and thus, as President Lenarts extrajudicially stated:
«That openness, on the part of the CJEU, to the views of national courts
and the ECtHR, not only makes possible cross-fertilization of ideas
between those judicial actors, but also serves to prevent normative
conflicts from arising».
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe, that in this matter, as in
(37) Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015, Gauweiler,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:7.
MICHELE GRAZIADEI - RICCARDO DE CARIA970
other matters concerning the ultimate basis of the EU — such as the
principle of legality — the CJEU is not yet ready to lay bare before our
eyes all that there is to know on the topic. We will have to wait and
observe future developments.
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